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5 
Issues and Conclusions 
A “Great Wall of Sand” in the South China Sea? 
Political, Legal and Military Aspects of the 
Island Dispute 
China has set new records in the ways, means and 
speed with which it has expanded its outposts in the 
South China Sea. Neighbouring states such as Vietnam 
have also extended their bases on small islands and 
reefs, but they have done so over many years and 
not within a few months. From September 2013 to 
June 2014 alone, more than ten million cubic metres 
of sand and cement were taken to five reefs in the 
Spratly Islands area. Among other things, a specially 
constructed ship sucked up sand from the seabed and 
poured it onto coral reefs or behind artificial walls. By 
March 2015, this had created a total surface area of 
about 14.5 square kilometres, which the commander 
of the US Pacific Fleet ironically dubbed “the Great 
Wall of Sand”. A reconnaissance flight in May 2015 
showed that one outpost had been equipped with a 
concrete runway measuring over three kilometres as 
well as a deep-water port, suggesting it has not just 
civilian but also military significance. Beijing insisted 
the works had been completed, but continued to build 
additional runways. In January 2016, the White House 
renewed its criticism of China’s activities, which, it 
said, created tensions and undermined regional stabil-
ity. Shortly afterward it became known that China had 
deployed two missile batteries on Woody Island, an 
area also claimed by both Taiwan and Vietnam. Despite 
Beijing’s claims to the contrary, its expansions signal 
an emerging militarisation of these disputed waters, 
whose plentiful resources and energy deposits have 
been considered potential causes of conflict since the 
1980s. 
The South China Sea is currently one of the world’s 
most contentious zones. But the situation risks becom-
ing even worse, despite the fact that all of the region’s 
states depend on stable and secure sea lines of commu-
nication. As a “superhighway of the seas” the South 
China Sea is an important route for the international 
transport of goods and raw materials. Developments 
there have a significant impact not only on distant 
trade nations such as Germany, but also on the coastal 
states of adjacent sea areas. Any impairment of ship-
ping traffic would immediately affect Japan and South 
Korea. Territorial conflicts in the South China Seas 
also have a direct impact on the East China Sea, where 
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6 
China and Japan are involved in an ongoing island dis-
pute. Japan has declared its intention to use its navy 
to prevent Chinese ships from transiting through the 
territorial waters of the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands in the future. In turn Beijing has finished build-
ing a second ship (CCG-3901) – the world’s largest – for 
the China Coast Guard (CCG). These “monster ships” 
manifest China’s maritime territorial claims through 
their size alone: they are bigger even than US guided 
missile destroyers of the Arleigh-Burke class (such as 
the USS Lassen). CCG-2901 patrols the East China Sea; 
the new ship is intended to assert China’s maritime 
claims in the South China Sea. China’s naval moderni-
zation means that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
can potentially enforce the territorial claims and deter 
other countries from resisting. This could heighten 
tensions in East Asia, where every intervention – by 
armed forces, maritime militias, or piracy – takes its 
toll on the maritime security and economic wellbeing 
of all. 
Therefore the South China Sea is currently an area 
of regional disputes that could potentially develop 
into an international conflict because some of the 
colliding interests are irreconcilable. On the one hand 
there are the territorial claims by the People’s Repub-
lic of China, which insists it has “indisputable sover-
eignty” over islands and waters of the South China 
Sea. These claims are a sacrosanct part of its domestic 
policy. On the other hand, the United States are wield-
ing their maritime power, which is a central plank of 
their foreign policy and the basis of their superpower 
status. At its core, this is a regional conflict about sea 
lines, territorial claims and resources that primarily 
involves ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
states and China. Nevertheless, it also has global reper-
cussions. First, it concerns “a superhighway of the seas”, 
which handles almost a third of the world’s sea trade. 
Any impediment to the shipping traffic would have a 
direct impact on world trade in general but also par-
ticularly on Japan and South Korea. Second, the South 
China Sea is closely connected to the rivalry between 
Bejing and Washington because important allies and 
partners of the United States are involved in the dis-
pute about China’s territorial claims. Third, it is a 
conflict about international norms and laws that calls 
into question a fundamental principle of the liberal 
world order: the “freedom of the seas” versus exclusive 
maritime zones. What, then, are the reasons of this 
conflict? How to gauge its past and future develop-
ments? What are the implications and potential ways 
of containing it both regionally and internationally? 
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The Territorial Conflicts in the South China Sea 
 
Because of its favourable monsoon winds for sailboats, 
the South China Sea1 was already an important trade 
route in ancient times. It is as vitally important to Asia 
as the Mediterranean Sea is to Europe; and, as with 
the Mediterranean, domination of the South China 
Sea must be understood as an attempt to control the 
region’s most important sea routes.2 As a Pacific Rim 
sea, the South China Sea was already used for the 
exchange of goods between Southeast Asia’s coastal 
states when the largely jungle-covered inland still 
made overland trade impossible. The Sea thus became 
the joint hub and pivot of a region characterised by 
diversity, be it political, economic, cultural or reli-
gious. 
In the 21st century, the South China Sea provides 
the main trade route for the prospering East Asian 
economies. Whoever controls it, controls a decisive 
part of the global economy. Over 60,000 ships trans-
porting goods valued at over 5.3 billion US dollars 
(including 1.2 bn from US trade and a substantial 
share from European and German foreign trade) pass 
through the South China Sea every year. This cor-
responds to almost a third of global trade. What is 
more, this “superhighway of the seas”3 ensures the 
supply of the Northeast and Southeast Asian states 
with energy and raw materials. It is virtually irre-
placeable.4 More than a third of the globally available 
 
1  The name “South China Sea” has become established in 
the English-speaking world and thus also as the commonly 
used international designation. In Southeast Asia it is known 
neutrally by the direction in which it lies, as seen from the 
respective country. Thus, the Chinese call it the ‘South Sea’ 
(nanhai) and the Vietnamese the “East Sea” (bien dong). The 
Philippines are alone in using, since 2012, the name “West 
Philippine Sea”. Cf. Sarah Raine and Christian Le Mière, 
Regional Disorder. The South China Sea Disputes (London: Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 2013), 13; Ger-
hard Will, Tough Crossing: Europa und die Konflikte in der Süd-
chinesischen See, SWP-Studie 10/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, June 2014), 7. 
2  Cf. David Abulafia, Das Mittelmeer. Eine Biographie (Frankfurt: 
S. Fischer, 2013), 813. 
3  Arne Perras, “Pazifikraum. Ritt auf dem Tiger”, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 29 April 2016, 4. 
4  Alternative routes mean long detours and significantly 
higher costs. The Arctic sea route to Northeast Asia, for in-
stance, can only be used for parts of the year. Cf. Euan 
crude oil (around 15.2 million barrels a day) is shipped 
to the states of the East Asian growth region via the 
Strait of Malacca, the entrance to the South China Sea. 
So is more than half the world’s liquefied natural gas 
(LNG).5 The states obtain their crude oil mostly via 
the South China Sea – about 80 percent in the case of 
China, 66 percent for South Korea and almost 60 per-
cent for Japan. Furthermore, about ten percent of the 
world’s catch of edible fish stem from the abundant 
fishing grounds of the South China Sea. And last but 
not least, its large offshore gas and oil fields have seen 
it labelled the “new Persian Gulf”. In 2013, the US 
Energy Information Administration – an agency of the 
US Energy Ministry responsible for statistical analyses 
– published its estimates of 11 billion barrels of oil 
and 190 billion cubic metres of gas under the South 
China Sea. The state oil company China National Off-
shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) assumes that the 
deposits are much larger still, at 125 bn barrels of oil.6 
This is not the first time the fields have been viewed as 
a potential cause of regional conflict, given the rising 
demand for oil.7 
 
Graham, “Maritime Security and Threats to Energy Transpor-
tation in Southeast Asia”, RUSI Journal 160, no. 2 (2015): 27. 
5  Part of the crude oil – around 1.4 million barrels a day 
(MMbbl/d) – is destined for Singapore and Malaysia, where it 
is refined and shipped onwards. The lion share (12.8 MMbbl/d) 
goes to China (4.5 MMbbl/d) and Japan (3.2 MMbbl/d), Asia’s 
biggest consumers of energy, as well as to South Korea via the 
East China Sea. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
South China Sea, 7 February 2013, http://www.eia.gov/beta/ 
international/analysis_includes/regions_of_interest/South_ 
China_Sea/south_china_sea.pdf. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Cf. U.S. Department of Defence (DoD), The Asia-Pacific 
Maritime Strategy: Achieving U.S. National Security Objectives in a 
Changing Environment, Washington, DC, 27 July 2015, 5; EIA, 
South China Sea (see note 5); Amos A. Jordan and William J. 
Taylor Jr., American National Security. Policy and Process (Balti-
more and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 376; 
Robert D. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron. The South China Sea and the End 
of a Stable Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014), 10, 170f.; 
Graham, “Maritime Security and Threats to Energy Trans-
portation in Southeast Asia“ (see note 4), 20–31; Ronald 
O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, R42784 (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service [CRS], 22 December 2015), 
2; Raine and Le Mière, Regional Disorder (see note 1), 12, 29, 
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8 
Its exceptional importance as a sea line of commu-
nication and a reservoir of resources has made the 
South China Sea and its four groups of islands (Pratas, 
Paracel, Spratly and Scarborough) the object of over-
lapping regional territorial claims by China and Tai-
wan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam. 
In some cases, this has already led to military confron-
tations and violent nationalist clashes. With the ex-
ception of Brunei, all the claimant states have erected 
various buildings and military installations on islands 
and coral reefs. There are twenty-six features occupied 
by Vietnam; ten by the Philippines; eight by China; 
seven by Malaysia; and two by Taiwan. Many of the 
reefs or rocks are underwater at high tide and are not 
suitable for human settlement unless they have been 
artificially consolidated. Only the largest natural 
island in the Spratly group, Itu Aba (Taiping), current-
ly occupied by Taiwan, is an “island” under the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS): it has all the required characteristics of a 
“naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, 
which is above water at high tide” (UNCLOS Article 
121 para 1). The island has been the object of disputes 
between China, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines, 
particularly since large oil reserves were suspected to 
exist under the Spratly Islands.8 
In accordance with UNCLOS, states can claim as 
their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) an area that 
stretches out to sea from their coast for up to 200 
nautical miles (370 kilometres), measured from the 
baseline along the coast (UNCLOS Arts. 55 and 57). The 
EEZ remains a part of the high seas, but the coastal 
state is entitled to exploit the zone’s natural resources, 
including fishing, and is granted individual sovereignty 
rights (UNCLOS Art. 56). China is laying claim to an 
area of the South China Sea that is more than 1,000 
kilometres from its coast, a claim justified by its presi-
 
75f.; Will Rogers, “The Role of Natural Resources in the South 
China Sea”, Cooperation from Strength. The United States, China 
and the South China Sea, ed. Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, DC: 
Center for a New American Security [CNAS], January 2012), 
87, 90; Mamdouh G. Salameh, “China, Oil and the Risk of 
Regional Conflict”, Survival 37, no. 4 (Winter 1995–1996):  
133–46. 
8  Cf. Richard Cronin and Zachary Dubel, Maritime Security in 
East Asia: Boundary Disputes, Resources, and the Future of Regional 
Stability (Washington, DC: Stimson, February 2013), 14f.; M. 
Taylor Fravel, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea and 
the Competition over Maritime Rights”, in Cooperation from 
Strength, ed. Cronin (see note 7), 34; Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron 
(see note 7), 13, 88. 
dent on historical grounds:9 Imperial China’s use of 
the maritime silk road, and the Potsdam Declaration 
of 26 July 1945, which contained the conditions for 
Japan’s surrender, including the return of areas and 
islands in the South China Sea that it had conquered 
since 1914.10 Moreover, the Chinese Nationalist Kuo-
mintang government brought out a map of China in 
1947 that shows all the islands to which China now 
lays claim – including the fishing, navigational and 
resource rights associated with them. According to 
this map, up to 90 percent of the South China Sea – 
two to three million square kilometres – falls under 
Chinese jurisdiction.11 
In May 2009, China’s Permanent Representation 
to the UN sent two notes verbales to the UN General 
Secretariat. They contained a map roughly based on 
the 1947 version and showing a U-shaped nine-dash 
line (NDL), as well as a declaration that China had 
“indisputable sovereignty” over the islands enclosed 
by the NDL and their territorial waters.12 Vietnam, 
Malaysia and the Philippines asserted their own, mu-
tually competing claims and also sent the UN notes 
 
9  “Islands in the South China Sea since ancient times are 
China’s territory”. The White House, Remarks by President Obama 
and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China in Joint Press Con-
ference, Washington, DC, 25 September 2015, http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/remarks-president-
obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint. 
10  Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang during his 2013 visit 
to Berlin. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Li Keqiang im Potsdamer Schloss 
Cecilienhof, Berlin, 26 May 2013, http://www.china-botschaft. 
de/det/zt/premier/t1043961.htm. Cf. Zhiguo Gao and Bing 
Bing Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, 
Status, and Implications”, The American Journal of International 
Law 107, no. 1 (2013): 101f.; Rana Mitter, “The End of the 
Second World War and the Shaping of Geopolitics in East 
Asia”, RUSI Journal 160, no. 4 (2015): 14–17. 
11  Cf. Markus Ackeret, “Angewandte chinesische Geografie”, 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 27 November 2012, 5; DoD, Annual Report 
to Congress. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China 2013 (Washington, DC, 2013), 3f.; Gao and 
Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line” (see note 10), 103, 108; James Kraska, 
“The Nine Ironies of the South China Sea Mess”, The Diplomat, 
17 September 2015; Raine and Le Mière, Regional Disorder (see 
note 1), 31. 
12  “China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in 
the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as 
well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached map).” 
Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, Notes 
Verbales CML/17/2009 and CML/18/2009, 7 May 2009, http://www. 
un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/ 
chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ 
clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009re_vnm.pdf. 
The Territorial Conflicts in the South China Sea 
SWP Berlin 
A “Great Wall of Sand” in the South China Sea? 
July 2016 
 
 
 
9 
Map 1 
Asia 
Source: Can&Able. 
 
verbales. The catalyst for this diplomatic flurry, how-
ever, was not China but a problematic deadline: sub-
missions on continental shelf areas had to be made 
to the UN by May 2009.13 Since 2009, however, Beijing 
has done much in the way of assertive diplomacy: in 
March of that year, Chinese ships prevented the USNS 
Impeccable from continuing its passage near the island 
province of Hainan and ordered it to leave the EEZ. 
Also in 2009, Beijing exerted pressure on foreign oil 
companies to stop exploring in disputed waters.14 
 
13  Submissions were received by the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). 
14  Cf. Raine and Le Mière, Regional Disorder (see note 1), 34, 
48; David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal. Obama’s Secret Wars 
and Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Broadway 
Paperbacks, 2012), 392. 
In a more recent note verbale, in April 2011, China 
added that Chinese sovereignty and its resulting claims 
were well-founded in history and the law.15 The bur-
den of proof for such historical claims, however, lies 
with the claimant and is quite difficult. China has 
therefore taken a different approach. It is focusing 
on extending the area of applicability of Chinese legis-
lation (for instance, in a law to protect the marine 
environment) beyond zones defined under maritime 
law – such as territorial waters (UNCLOS Art. 3), EEZ 
 
15  “China’s sovereignty and related rights and jurisdiction 
in the South China Sea are supported by abundant historical 
and legal evidence.” Permanent Mission of the People’s Repub-
lic of China, Note Verbale CML/8/2011, 14 April 2011, http://www. 
un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/ 
chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf. 
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10 
(Art. 55) or continental shelf (Art. 76) – to include “any 
other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s 
Republic of China”.16 In other words, China is attempt-
ing to fill a perceived legal vacuum using national legis-
lation. Such “gap-filling”, however, is questionable 
under international law.17 
Ultimately, the practical significance of the nine-
dash line remains unclear. This ambiguity seems to 
be deliberate, affording China a certain latitude in the 
claims it puts forward, and making it more difficult 
for other parties to refute them. 
The United States have urged a peaceful solution 
of the territorial conflicts in the South China Sea, but 
have not taken a position on the various claims made. 
Nevertheless, the US State Department has examined 
China’s territorial claims and has criticised the notes 
verbales for not specifying whether they concern only 
ownership of the islands (which are not named indi-
vidually) or maritime zones as well.18 US diplomats 
have thus called on China to clarify its position unam-
biguously and bring it into line with maritime law.19 
Furthermore, the geographical data are insufficient 
to clearly define the area. In a move likely to aggravate 
matters, Chinese maps published since 2014 show 
a vertical “line” east of Taiwan, thereby uniting the 
 
16  “This law shall apply to the internal water, territorial sea, 
contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental 
shelf of the People’s Republic of China and any other sea 
areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China.” 
The Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/marine-
environmental-protection-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china. 
17  Cf. U.S. Department of State (DoS), Limits in the Seas. China: 
Maritime Claims in the South China Sea (Washington, DC, 5 Decem-
ber 2014), 10, 17; Gao and Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line” (see note 
10), 123. 
18  “China has not clarified through legislation, proclama-
tion, or other official statements the legal basis or nature of 
its claim associated with the dashed-line map.” DoS, Limits 
in the Seas. China (see note 17), 1. Cf. ibid., 11–15; O’Rourke, 
Maritime and EEZ Disputes (see note 7), 23. 
19  “Under international law, maritime claims in the South 
China Sea must be derived from land features. Any use of the 
‘nine-dash line’ by China to claim maritime rights not based 
on claimed land features would be inconsistent with inter-
national law. The international community would welcome 
China to clarify or adjust its nine-dash line claim to bring it 
in accordance with the international law of the sea.” Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Danny 
Russel in a February 2014 hearing, quoted by Jeffrey A. Bader, 
The U.S. and China’s Nine-Dash Line: Ending the Ambiguity (Wash-
ington, DC: Brookings, 6 February 2014). 
island republic with the People’s Republic with a stroke 
of the pen.20 
This already complicated situation concerning mari-
time law became even more politically charged at the 
annual ASEAN conference in Hanoi in July 2010. US 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared freedom of 
navigation in the SSC to be in the national interest 
of the United States and stressed that international law 
had to be respected.21 A particularly problematic legal 
point between Washington and Beijing is whether 
military activities by third states are prohibited in 
EEZs, as they are in territorial waters (as part of the 
“right to innocent passage” provisions contained in 
UNCLOS Art. 17). China is demanding that the US stop 
such activities in its EEZ, which have repeatedly led 
to incidents in Chinese airspace and at sea. The US 
follows a broad interpretation, under which the same 
rights obtain in an EEZ as on the high seas.22 China, 
on the other hand, takes a much narrower view. To 
that extent, the controversy between the two powers 
resembles the historical dispute of mare liberum versus 
mare clausum.23 
 
20  Ishaan Tharoor, “Could This Map of China Start a War?”, 
Washington Post, 27 June 2014; Harry Kazianis, “China’s 10 
Red Lines in the South China Sea”, The Diplomat, 1 July 2014; 
O’Rourke, Maritime and EEZ Disputes (see note 7), 23; DoS, Limits 
in the Seas. China (see note 17), 3, 6. 
21  Mark Landler, “Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges 
China on Disputed Islands”, New York Times, 23 July 2010. 
22  “Robert Scher, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs […] stated that ‘we reject any 
nation’s attempt to place limits on the exercise of high seas 
freedoms within an exclusive economic zones [sic!] […] Cus-
tomary international law, as reflected in articles 58 and 87 
of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
guarantees to all nations the right to exercise within the EEZ, 
high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, as well as 
the traditional uses of the ocean related to those freedoms. 
It has been the position of the United States since 1982 when 
the Convention was established, that the navigational rights 
and freedoms applicable within the EEZ are qualitatively and 
quantitatively the same as those rights and freedoms appli-
cable on the high seas.’” O’Rourke, Maritime and EEZ Disputes 
(see note 7), 30. 
23  The concept of the “freedom of the seas” (mare liberum), as 
proposed by Hugo Grotius in the 17th century, is a key prin-
ciple in maritime law. Grotius declared the seas to be the 
common good of all humanity, arguing that neither the Bible 
nor conquest nor customary law were able to change the fact 
that the sea, by its very nature, was open to use by all. By con-
trast, his contemporary John Selden believed that claims to 
exclusive rights did exist (mare clausum): military control over 
a claimed sea area conferred state sovereignty, which could 
then be enforced. The legal principle of free seas ultimately 
prevailed because it more closely corresponded to the mari-
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These fundamentally incompatible interpretations 
of maritime law – freedom of navigation versus exclu-
sive maritime zones – collide heavily in the case of 
the land features in the South China Sea claimed by 
China. In May 2015, PLA Navy declared one of the 
outposts to be a “military exclusion zone”,24 denying 
the US the right to freedom of navigation and over-
flight. However, China has itself not acted according 
to its own demands. In September 2015, five Chinese 
navy ships conducted an “innocent passage” through 
the Aleutian Islands, part of the US state of Alaska. 
The passage had not been announced beforehand – 
although China itself always demands such announce-
ments from others. Similarly, in July 2014, the PLAN 
electronic surveillance ship Beijixing carried out mili-
tary reconnaissance in the US EEZ near Hawaii, an 
activity that China itself does not tolerate from others 
in its own waters.25 
Washington’s conduct, however, is ambiguous as 
well. On the one hand, the United States argue, in 
accordance with UNCLOS (which the US Senate still 
refuses to ratify), that claims to maritime zones are 
valid only if they emanate from a recognised coastal 
state. On the other hand, it wants to apply a broad 
interpretation of maritime law in Washington’s 
favour, so that the same military activities are allowed 
in any EEZ as on the high seas. Both arguments are 
certainly plausible. EEZs cover over 30 percent of the 
world’s seas. If the United States renounced their mili-
tary activities in all of these, they could hardly con-
tinue to fulfil their role as guardian of the seas (and 
the global commons). That would also jeopardise their 
 
time interests of the most important European states at the 
time. It also applied to those sea areas that are far from any 
coast, which make up over 50 percent of the earth’s surface. 
At the same time, it is an example of how reconciling the 
interests of various states brings about a legal system that 
encourages economic interdependence. Nonetheless, there 
is still a counter-current that aims to put sea areas located 
closer to land (and their resources) under the control of 
coastal states. Cf. Michael Paul, The United States, China and 
the Freedom of the Seas. Washington’s FONOPs Conflict with Beijing, 
SWP Comments 15/2016 (Berlin: SWP, March 2016), 2–3. 
24  David S. Cloud, “U.S. Confronts China in Air, at Sea”, 
Los Angeles Times, 22 May 2015, 6. 
25  Sam LaGrone, “U.S. Pacific Commander: Chinese Spy Ship 
Off Hawaii Has an Upside”, U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) News, 
29 July 2014; Jeremy Page and Gordon Lubold, “Chinese Navy 
Ships Came within 12 Nautical Miles of U.S. Coast”, The Wall 
Street Journal, 4 September 2015; O’Rourke, Maritime and EEZ 
Disputes (see note 7), 70f.; Missy Ryan and Dan Lamothe, “Chi-
nese Naval Ships Flirted with U.S. Soil”, Washington Post, 5 Sep-
tember 2015, A02. 
status as a world power. Consequently, the US stresses 
the freedom of the sea as a guiding principle, as Secre-
tary of Defence Ashton Carter has repeatedly declared.26 
However, for once even China and Vietnam agree in 
rejecting US demands for the right to conduct military 
activities in EEZs when they are unannounced and un-
limited. 
 
 
26  “[...] the United States will fly, sail, and operate wher-
ever international law allows, as U.S. forces do all around 
the world.” DoD, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue: “A Regional Security 
Architecture Where Everyone Rises”, Secretary of Defense Speech, 
Singapore, 30 May 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/ 
Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606676/iiss-shangri-la-dialogue-
a-regional-security-architecture-where-everyone-rises. 
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Map 2 
Beijing’s territorial claims in the South China Sea 
Source: Can&Able. 
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The Spratly Islands and the “Great Wall of Sand” 
 
The Spratly archipelago (called Nansha in Chinese) lies 
at the heart of China’s territorial claims (see Map 2, 
p. 12). It extends over more than 1,000 kilometres and 
consists of about 120 scattered rocks, coral reefs and 
small islands. The majority of these are not islands 
under maritime law (UNCLOS Art. 121) since they are 
mostly covered by water, and such a low-tide elevation 
which is submerged at high tides has no territorial sea 
of its own (Art. 13). Taiwan has stationed coast guard 
personnel on the largest natural island in the group, 
Itu Aba (Taiping), which has a surface area of half a 
square kilometre. Its port facilities were renewed in 
February 2015 with the support of mainland China. 
China and Taiwan make similar claims to the entire 
island group, according to the Nine-Dash Line. The 
archipelago is also claimed in its entirety by Vietnam. 
Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines each claim parts. 
With the exception of Brunei, all of these claimants 
have already taken possession of islands or other fea-
tures in the sea, erected buildings for civilian and 
military use on many of the otherwise uninhabited 
islands, and taken steps to reclaim land. In the 1980s, 
for instance, Malaysia built a runway on Swallow 
Island, and the Philippines on Thitu Island. Between 
2009 and 2014, Vietnam engaged in various activities 
to reclaim land.27 
In 1998 China used national legislation to grant 
itself jurisdiction over a 200 nautical mile zone for 
all its claimed territories. Among these, it counts the 
entire Spratly archipelago. In 2011, it applied to 
the UN for an EEZ of 200 nautical miles for each of 
the reefs it occupies. Using national legislation and 
state practice, China has thus laid claim to almost the 
entire South China Sea, largely corresponding to the 
NDL. In 2014 and 2015, before the controversy could 
be settled either diplomatically or by arbitration, 
China created new facts on the ground by reclaiming 
land. Domestically, this approach has been established 
as the party line since January 2013, when President 
Xi Jinping excluded any compromise on territorial 
 
27  Cf. DoD, Asia-Pacific Maritime Strategy (see note 7), 15f.; 
Shannon Tiezzi, “Mainland Firm Lends a Hand as Taiwan Ex-
pands South China Sea Presence”, The Diplomat, 10 February 
2015. 
matters before the Politburo. Internationally Beijing’s 
measures have been catastrophic. Every area used 
by China for reclaiming land – such as the Fiery Cross, 
Mischief and Subi Reefs (see Map 3, p. 22) – is also 
claimed by at least one other state. Three, including 
the Mischief Reef, are inside the EEZ claimed by the 
Philippines, which is currently under arbitration in 
The Hague.28 
China has set new records in the ways, means and 
speed of its land reclamation activities.29 No state had 
previously reclaimed land to this extent. Besides other 
means, a specially constructed ship sucked up sand 
and rocks from the seafloor and poured them over 
coral reefs or behind artificial walls. This had a devas-
tating impact on the fragile eco-system.30 During the 
Spratly archipelago land reclamation, more than ten 
million cubic metres of sand are believed to have been 
transported to five reefs.31 By March 2015, this had 
created a surface area of about 14.5 square kilometres, 
which the Commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Admiral 
Harry Harris Jr., ironically dubbed “the Great Wall of 
 
28  Cf. Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, 
Note Verbale CML/8/2011 (see note 15); Asia Maritime Transpar-
ency Initiative (AMTI)/Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS), Island Tracker, http://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/; 
Peter Dutton, “Cracks in the Global Foundation: International 
Law and Instability in the South China Sea”, in Cooperation 
from Strength, ed. Cronin (see note 7), 73f. 
29  “China has now reclaimed 17 times more land in 20 
months than the other claimants combined over the past 
40 years, accounting for approximately 95 percent of all 
reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands.” DoD, Asia-Pacific 
Maritime Strategy (see note 7), 16. 
30  James Borton and Nguyen Chu Hoi, “China and the Deep 
Blue Sea”, Project Syndicate, 8 September 2015; Gabriel Domin-
guez, “Beijing’s South China Sea Projects ‘Highly Disruptive’ 
to Local Ecosystems”, Deutsche Welle, 16 April 2015; Ben Dolven, 
Jennifer K. Elsea, Susan V. Lawrence, Ronald O’Rourke and 
Ian E. Rinehart, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: 
Implications and Policy Options, R44072 (Washington, DC: CRS, 
18 June 2015), 4. 
31  The ship used was designed by Shanghai Jiaotang Univer-
sity and the German engineering firm Vosta LMG. It is the 
third, and biggest, ship of this type (a cutter suction dredger) 
in Asia. It can move up to 4,500 cubic metres of sand per hour 
and reach depths of up to 30 metres. Dolven et al., Chinese 
Land Reclamation (see note 30), 17f. 
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Sand”.32 Substantial expansion was carried out on 
Woody Island (now 2.13 square kilometres in size), 
in the northern Paracel archipelago as well as on the 
reefs Fiery Cross (2.74 sq km), Subi (3.95 sq km) and 
Mischief (5.85 sq km) in the Spratly archipelago (see 
Map 3, p. 22). They have each been equipped with a 
runway three kilometres long, fit for even Chinese 
fighter bombers.33 
The first public account of these activities came in 
March 2015 when Foreign Minister Wang Yi explained 
that China was carrying out “necessary construction 
on its own islands and reefs”, which concerned no-one 
else. He contrasted this with other countries which 
“engage in illegal work in another person’s house”. 
China would accept no criticism, he stated, since it 
was merely erecting buildings on its own land, which 
it had every right to do. However, China would main-
tain the freedom of navigation and play a constructive 
role for peace and stability in the region.34 China 
argued that it had shown massive restraint in the 
past, but that the time had now come for works that 
primarily served civilian purposes and fulfilled inter-
national obligations.35 The search for the Malaysian 
passenger plane, flight MH 370, which disappeared 
in March 2014, showed that an operational base was 
needed to improve maritime surveillance in the 
 
32  “China is creating a great wall of sand”, Admiral Harry 
Harris Jr. said in a speech to the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute (ASPI), Canberra, 31 March 2015, http://www.cpf.navy. 
mil/leaders/harry-harris/speeches/2015/03/ASPI-Australia.pdf. 
33  CSIS, Island Tracker (see note 28); Edward Wong and Jane 
Perlez, “As Tensions with U.S. Grow, Beijing Says It Will Stop 
Building Artificial Islands in South China Sea”, New York 
Times, 16 June 2015. 
34  Johnny Erling, “Stückweise holt sich Beijing das Süd-
chinesische Meer”, Die Welt, 11 June 2014; Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi Meets the Press, 8 March 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ 
mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1243662.shtml. Cf. Dolven et al., 
Chinese Land Reclamation (see note 30), 13–15. 
35  “China’s work on the South China Sea islands is intended 
to fulfil its international responsibilities and obligations, 
such as providing maritime search and rescue services, en-
suring safety of navigation, disaster prevention and mitiga-
tion, meteorological observations, environmental protection, 
and fishery production.” “US, Please Stop Stirring Up Trouble 
in the South China Sea”, People’s Daily, 3 June 2015. Cf. Dolven 
et al., Chinese Land Reclamation (see note 30), 14f.; Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign 
Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Remarks on Issues Relating to 
China’s Construction Activities on the Nansha Islands and Reefs, 
16 June 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_ 
665399/s2510_665401/t1273370.shtml. 
area.36 However, radar installations and other means 
justified by civilian reconnaissance can also be used for 
military purposes. In a domestically popular move, the 
director of the South China Sea Institute, Wu Sichun, 
rationalised that China had been “forced” to create the 
artificial islands for its self-defence: The defence co-
operation of the United States with the Philippines had 
left it feeling insecure. In January 2016, the head of 
China’s navy, Admiral Wu Shengli, similarly declared 
that the “necessary defensive measures” in the Spratly 
area were not a case of militarisation and would not 
be abandoned. Whether or not they were used 
depended on the extent of the threat. The Chinese 
Foreign Ministry added that the outposts enabled 
China to protect its territorial sovereignty and 
maritime rights and interests and were required for 
military defence.37 
Successful “salami-slicing” tactics? 
The outposts continue to be controversial under inter-
national law. What is clear, however, is that artificial 
islands do not expand a state’s territorial waters. 
Politically, China’s land-reclamation measures have 
violated both the spirit and the letter of the 2002 Dec-
laration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea (DoC). In it, the ASEAN states and China explicitly 
– but non-bindingly – agreed to act with restraint.38 
For the first time in ASEAN history, China was criti-
cised by its Southeast Asian neighbours at the April 
2015 summit of heads of states and governments in 
Kuala Lumpur. Land reclamation, the statement said, 
 
36  Cf. Kevin Baron, “China’s New Islands Are Clearly Military, 
U.S. Pacific Chief Says”, Defense One, 24 July 2015; Dolven et al., 
Chinese Land Reclamation (see note 30), 10f. 
37  Sam LaGrone, “Head of Chinese Navy Defends South China 
Sea Moves in Teleconference with CNO Richardson”, USNI 
News, 20 January 2016; O’Rourke, Maritime and EEZ Disputes 
(see note 7), 65; Wong and Perlez, “Beijing Says It Will Stop 
Building Artificial Islands” (see note 33). 
38  “5. The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the 
conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate dis-
putes and affect peace and stability including, among others, 
refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently unin-
habited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to 
handle their differences in a constructive manner.” ASEAN, 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 17 Oc-
tober 2002, http://www.asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-
the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2. 
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had undermined trust and could jeopardise peace, secu-
rity and stability in the South China Sea.39 
In May 2015, the Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, 
launching Taiwan’s South China Sea Peace Initiative, 
pleaded for self-restraint. Nevertheless, he also em-
phasised that the sea areas surrounding Nansha (Sprat-
ly), Xisha (Paracel), Chungsha (Macclesfield Bank) and 
Tungsha (Pratas) were historically, geographically and 
legally part of China’s territory, and thus of Taiwan’s – 
a position shared by the People’s Republic. His pro-
posed solution would pragmatically divide up existing 
marine resources while putting territorial claims 
on hold.40 However, a similar proposal was already 
presented by the Philippines in 2011, in vain. Since 
then, China’s robust approach has not only made it 
more difficult to agree on detailed binding rules of 
conduct. It has also made a fair division of marine 
resources look less realistic. As in 1990, an agreement 
along the lines proposed by Ma may well be scuppered 
by Beijing’s insistence that Chinese claims would have 
to be recognised first.41 
China’s behaviour in the region is not at all atypi-
cal. Vietnam carried out land reclamation as long ago 
as the 1970s, which was later secured through acts 
of sovereignty by erecting buildings and stationing 
military personnel. China is progressing in a similiar 
manner, but its activities are wider in scope and have 
more far-reaching consequences. Politically, its land 
reclamation expands China’s sovereignty claims over 
the previously extraterritorial islands. State sovereignty 
is one of China’s core interests, alongside security, 
territorial integrity, national reunification and its 
 
39  Chairman’s Statement of the 26th ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur 
& Langkawi, 27 April 2015, “Our People, Our Commitment, Our 
Vision”, Point 59–62, http://www.miti.gov.my/miti/resources/ 
fileupload/Chairman%20Statement%2026th%20ASEAN%20 
Summit.pdf. 
40  “The principle that sovereignty cannot be divided, but 
resources can be shared, however, allows sovereignty disputes 
to be shelved while development proceeds jointly, he said.” 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan), Presi-
dent Ma Proposes South China Sea Peace Initiative, Taipei, 26 May 
2015, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n= 
8157691CA2AA32F8&sms=4F8ED5441E33EA7B&s=F71CA796 
3F189938. 
41  Cf. Dolven et al., Chinese Land Reclamation (see note 30), 12; 
Kay Möller, “China in Ostasien: Die Renaissance der Pax 
Sinica”, in Weltordnung oder Chaos? Beiträge zur internationalen 
Politik, ed. Albrecht Zunker (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993), 322; 
Ian Storey, “China’s Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy in 
the South China Sea”, in Cooperation from Strength, ed. Cronin 
(see note 7), 60. 
political system.42 Strategically, the bases substantially 
extend the radius of its fishing fleets, coast guard and 
military, since they offer re-provisioning and protec-
tion far from their home ports on Hainan or the main-
land. Militarily, the area can in future be controlled 
more effectively both above and below water, using 
radar, aircraft and drones. Ships could also be tempo-
rarily stationed there. The new bases will also enhance 
Chinese airspace. China has ordered Russian Su-35 
fighter planes, which have communications systems 
allowing contact with an operating base for distances 
of up to 1,500 kilometres – enough for patrolling the 
South China Sea.43 Economically, the outposts are im-
portant for the exploration and subsequent exploita-
tion of oil and gas reserves located there. In all, the 
newly consolidated bases give China a more regular, 
concentrated and effective presence in the South 
China Sea. 
Concrete runways over 3 kilometres long have been 
built on Fiery Cross and Subi. A runway on Mischief 
Reef followed in January 2016. For search and rescue 
shorter landing strips would have sufficed. Clearly, its 
considerable length has a military rationale: it allows 
fighter aircraft and even long-range bombers to be 
deployed. The bases substantially improve the oper-
ating range and thus the deployment possibilities of 
PLA forces. Ships of the maritime militias,44 Chinese 
Coast Guard and PLA navy can now be deployed in 
the disputed areas practically on a daily basis, as can 
 
42  “China is firm in upholding its core interests which 
include the following: state sovereignty, national security, 
territorial integrity and national reunification, China’s 
political system established by the Constitution and overall 
social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustain-
able economic and social development.” Information Office 
of the State Council, China’s Peaceful Development, Beijing, 6 Sep-
tember 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/ 
2011-09/06/c_131102329_4.htm. Cf. Raine and Le Mière, 
Regional Disorder (see note 1), 58f. 
43  Peter Wood, “Su-35 Purchase: Evidence of Sino-Russian 
Relations’ Weakness or Strength?”, China Brief 15, no. 23 
(7 December 2015): 1–3, http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/ 
media/_CB_15_23.pdf. 
44  Unlike the navy, the fishing boats and crews that make up 
the “maritime militias” look civilian – but some have under-
gone military training. They can use force against other boats 
or ships while having less of an escalating effect. Cf. Andrew 
S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Irregular Forces at Sea: 
‘Not Merely Fishermen – Shedding Light on China’s Maritime 
Militia’”, Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 2 No-
vember 2015; Christopher P. Cavas, “China’s ‘Little Blue Men’ 
Take Navy’s Place in Disputes”, Defense News 3, no. 20 (9–16 No-
vember 2015), 1, 6. 
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planes. If Y-9 type surveillance aircraft or Ka-28 heli-
copters were stationed on the new bases, they would 
be also a distinct boost to China’s ability to combat 
submarines. 
The harbour on Fiery Cross appears to be of suffi-
cient size for warships, meaning type 054 frigates, 
type 056 corvettes and type 022 missile ships. Radar, 
ground-to-air missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) 
and drones can now also be stationed on the new out-
posts. All told, this puts China in a position to control 
large swathes of the South China Sea and incorporate 
them into its military strategy.45 
The bases could be used defensively to secure Chi-
nese claims as well as to extend them offensively. In 
the meantime, they create a tangible atmosphere of 
threat for neighbouring states. China’s exercise in July 
2015 involving over 100 PLAN ships as well as the PLA 
Airforce and PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) made that very 
clear. It improved China’s “rapid reaction” capability, 
the state news agency Xinhua reported. China tested 
anti-ship cruise missiles as well as the transfer and 
logistical supply of units of the Rocket Force. In a 
placatory move, a PLAN spokesperson claimed these 
drills were simply part of annual exercises, but added 
that the Nansha (Spratly) Islands and surrounding 
waters had belonged to China since time immemorial.46 
In fact, China’s southern fleet already conducted live-
firing drills back in July 2010. All three of its fleets 
participated. In November 2011 China tested amphib-
ious landings, and in 2013 it even simulated fighter-
bomber attacks on harbours on the open sea. All of 
these exercises increase its offensive capability against 
other states’ bases in the South China Sea.47 Troop con-
tingents deployed on these bases would make it pos-
 
45  “‘If you look at all of these facilities – and you could 
imagine a network of missiles sites, runways for their fifth 
generation fighters and surveillance sites and all that – it 
creates a mechanism in which China would have de facto 
control over the South China Sea in any scenario short of 
war,’ [Admiral Harry] Harris said.” Sam LaGrone, “Report: 
Chinese Complete Runway on Reclaimed South China Sea 
Island”, USNI News, 25 September 2015. Cf. DoD, Asia-Pacific 
Maritime Strategy (see note 7), 15–17; Dolven et al., Chinese Land 
Reclamation (see note 30), 4, 7–9; Raine and Le Mière, Regional 
Disorder (see note 1), 66; Demetri Sevastopulo, “White House 
Urges Beijing to Halt Runway Building on Reefs, South China 
Sea”, The Financial Times, 15 January 2016, 1. 
46  “Don’t Excessively Interpret South China Sea Drill: China 
Navy”, New China, 25 July 2015; “Chinese Navy Conducts Live 
Firing Drill in South China Sea”, Xinhua, 28 July 2015; U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015 Report 
to Congress (Washington, DC, 17 November 2015), 367f. 
47  Raine and Le Mière, Regional Disorder (see note 1), 67. 
sible to attack disputed features in surrounding 
waters at short notice. The new outposts therefore 
have substantial importance for the regional balance 
of power, which has tilted further away from claimant 
states like Vietnam and the Philippines. China’s land 
reclamation has also exacerbated the political, legal 
and economic situation in neighbouring countries. 
The previous status quo can hardly be re-established, 
now that Beijing has literally created a new reality 
that cannot be undone – neither the concreting of the 
reefs nor the loss of eco-systems. 
The new outposts also potentially lay the ground 
for an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), as al-
ready exists in the East China Sea. In May 2015, the 
deputy chief of staff of the PLA, Admiral Sun Jianguo, 
did not exclude the possibility of establishing an ADIZ 
in the South China Sea. An employee of the US National 
Security Council (NSC) commented that establishing a 
further ADIZ was “provocative and destabilising”; Ad-
miral Harris declared that the US would ignore a new 
ADIZ as it ignores the ADIZ in the East China Sea.48 
In May 2015, Washington dispatched a reconnais-
sance aircraft to the new outposts, directing inter-
national attention to China’s activities. The plane was 
not intercepted by Chinese fighter aircraft, as had 
previously been the case near Hainan in August 2014. 
However, PLA Navy ordered the crew immediately to 
leave its “military exclusion zone”, even though the 
aircraft was over 12 nautical miles from Fiery Cross 
Reef, the location of the newly consolidated base.49 In 
a front-page article in the state newspaper Global Times, 
the Chinese leadership in Beijing made it clear that it 
would not accede to US demands to stop construction 
work. It warned that if Washington continued to 
insist, there was the risk of military confrontation 
“sooner or later”.50 A former member of the Reagan 
 
48  Cf. Dolven et al., Chinese Land Reclamation (see note 30), 
8f., 11, 21; Edward Wong, “China Says It Could Set Up Air 
Defense Zone in South China Sea”, New York Times, 31 May 
2015, 8; Sam LaGrone, “PACOM Harris: U.S. Would Ignore a 
‘Destabilizing’ Chinese South China Sea Air Defense Identi-
fication Zone”, USNI News, 26 February 2016. 
49  “‘Foreign military aircraft, this is Chinese navy. You are 
approaching our military alert zone. Leave immediately,’ 
the Chinese dispatcher said in a radio transmission, the Navy 
recounted Thursday. When the U.S. crew responded that it 
was flying in international airspace, the Chinese dispatcher 
answered, ‘This is the Chinese navy. [...] You go!’” Cloud, “U.S. 
Confronts China in Air, at Sea” (see note 24), 6. 
50  “If the US sets its bottom line on the condition that China 
must stop its construction work, then military confrontation 
will start sooner or later.” “Onus on US to Cool South China 
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administration cautioned that the South China Sea 
should not be turned into a casus belli such as the 
Balkans in the First World War – China’s careful 
“salami-slicing tactics” were not worth a military con-
frontation.51 Besides, he argued, its activities neither 
violated the law of the sea nor threatened freedom of 
navigation. In his view, China’s militarisation was 
cause for criticism, since the new bases and harbours 
could be used for military purposes. However, in the 
past that had not been sufficient reason for the United 
States to demand the cessation of construction activ-
ities at any higher level than diplomatic appeals. De 
facto he suggested tolerating Chinese tactics. Liberal 
voices meanwhile pointed out that Washington 
should not consider every artificial island or runway 
as a direct threat to its own interests or those of other 
states. After all, Beijing’s behaviour was to be expected 
from a new great power, and the “stationary aircraft 
carriers” it was creating with its outposts were analo-
gous to the real US carriers. Land reclamation of this 
scope was clearly new, but not automatically a threat.52 
In sum, China’s “salami-slicing” approach to the island 
dispute has been extremely successful. If it pursues 
this tactic, it will very likely end up controlling a mari-
time zone that more or less corresponds to the area 
enclosed by the Nine-Dash Line and encompasses nearly 
the whole South China Sea. 
The USS Lassen and the Freedom of the Seas 
On 27 October 2015, the guided missile destroyer USS 
Lassen (DDG-82) passed less than 12 nautical miles from 
a Chinese outpost on Subi Reef in the South China 
Sea.53 The reef has been occupied by China since 1988 
 
Sea Heat”, Global Times, 24 May 2015. Cf. DoD, A Regional Secu-
rity Architecture Where Everyone Rises (see note 26). 
51  Doug Bandow, “The Ultimate Irony: Is China the ‘America’ 
of Asia?”, The National Interest, 27 May 2015. 
52  Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Don’t Be Provoked: China and the 
United States in the South China Sea”, Brookings Brief, 18 Sep-
tember 2015. 
53  “A U.S. defense official told CNN that the destroyer USS 
Lassen ‘conducted a transit’ within 12 nautical miles of Subi 
Reef in the Spratly Islands [...]. The operation put the ship 
within an area that would be considered Chinese sovereign 
territory if the U.S. recognized the man-made islands as being 
Chinese territory, the official added.” Jim Sciutto and Barbara 
Starr, “U.S. Warship Sails Close to Chinese Artificial Island in 
South China Sea”, CNN, 27 October 2015. On the following 
section, see Paul, The United States, China and the Freedom of the 
Seas (see note 23), 1f. 
and forms its northernmost outpost in the Spratly 
Islands, close to the Philippines. Since July 2014, it has 
been transformed into a base measuring 3.95 square 
kilometres.54 US Secretary of Defence Carter described 
the US destroyer’s operation as a routine move in 
accordance with international law. He added that 
Washington would not take any further position on 
competing territorial claims. He also made clear, 
however, that this “freedom of navigation” operation 
(FONOP) was intended to demonstrate that the US 
would not accept any restrictions on its freedom of 
navigation in this region.55 
The naval manoeuvre had been preceded by months 
of controversy in Washington. High-ranking represen-
tatives of both parties in Congress, including John 
McCain as chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Com-
mittee and Bob Corker as chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, had called on Carter and 
Secretary of State John Kerry to respond to shifts in 
the status quo of the region. A policy of restraint 
could be a “dangerous mistake”, McCain said, because 
respecting the twelve-mile zone would mean de facto 
sovereignty, agreed to tacitly.56 
Washington had in fact for years largely ignored 
the implications of China’s behaviour in the South 
China Sea. The passage of the USS Lassen was the first 
“Freedom of Navigation” operation in the area since 
2012.57 However, opinions diverged as to the message 
it was supposed to convey. Subi Reef is a “low-tide 
elevation” (UNCLOS Art. 13), generating no claim to 
a territorial sea. To that extent the transit of the US 
warship was no “innocent passage”, as that applies 
 
54  See AMTI/CSIS, Subi Reef Tracker, http://amti.csis.org/subi-
reef-tracker/ (accessed 17 February 2016). 
55  “[...] this FONOP challenged attempts by claimants to 
restrict navigation rights and freedoms around features they 
claim, including policies by some claimants requiring prior 
permission or notification of transits within territorial seas.” 
Carter in a note to McCain of 22 December 2015, in “Docu-
ment: SECDEF Carter Letter to McCain on South China Sea 
Freedom of Navigation Operation”, USNI News, 5 January 2016. 
Cf. Ankit Panda, “After Months of Waiting, US Finally Begins 
Freedom of Navigation Patrols Near China’s Man-Made Islands”, 
The Diplomat, 27 October 2015; Michael J. Green, Bonnie S. 
Glaser and Gregory B. Poling, The U.S. Asserts Freedom of Naviga-
tion in the South China Sea (Washington, DC: CSIS, 27 October 
2015). 
56  Austin Wright, Bryan Bender and Philip Ewing, “Obama 
Team, Military at Odds over South China Sea”, Politico, 31 July 
2015. Cf. James Kraska, “The Legal Rationale for Going Inside 
12”, AMTI Brief, 11 September 2015. 
57  Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “US Hasn’t Challenged Chinese 
‘Islands’ since 2012”, Breaking Defense, 17 September 2015. 
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only in territorial waters. Some argued, however, that 
the USS Lassen’s passage within twelve miles implied 
recognition of China’s claims.58 In fact, the opposite 
was true. The USS Lassen operation was intended to 
underline that China’s base-building activities had 
not altered the status quo concerning free navigation. 
Consequently, the Americans treated the outpost 
erected on a “low-tide elevation” as an artificial island, 
which may have a security zone of 500 metres but no 
territorial sea.59 The second “Freedom of Navigation” 
operation, the patrol of the USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG-54) 
close to Triton Island in January 2016 was directed 
against “excessive claims” by China, Taiwan and Viet-
nam. Here too, the passage occurred without the prior 
notification demanded by China and Vietnam.60 This 
was also true of the third operation in early May 2016, 
when the USS William P. Lawrence (DDG-110) passed 
within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef.61 
By ignoring artificial outposts and the associated 
claims to territorial waters, the United States is acting 
to prevent China acquiring possession by default. 
Under international law, any territorial acquisition 
presupposes that effective sovereignty is exercised 
over the territory during considerable lengths of time 
and without interruption.62 While the creation of 
 
58  Euan Graham, “Innocent Passage: Did the US Just Fumble 
Its South China Sea Strategy?”, the interpreter, 4 November 
2015, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/11/04/ 
Innocent-passage-Did-the-US-just-fumbled-its-South-China-Sea-
strategy.aspx. Cf. Euan Graham, “Freedom of Navigation and 
Collective Self-Interest”, ASEAN Focus 3 (December 2015/ 
January 2016): 8f. 
59  Cf. Bonnie S. Glaser and Peter A. Dutton, “The U.S. Navy’s 
Freedom of Navigation Operation around Subi Reef: Decipher-
ing U.S. Signaling”, The National Interest, 6 November 2015; 
Raul “Pete” Pedrozo and James Kraska, “Can’t Anybody Play 
This Game? US FON Operations and Law of the Sea”, Lawfare, 
17 November 2015. 
60  Cf. Jane Perlez, “U.S. Challenges China’s Claim of Islands 
With Maritime Operation”, New York Times, 30 January 2016; 
Shannon Tiezzi, “China Rejects Latest US FONOP in the South 
China Sea”, The Diplomat, 2 February 2016; Gregory Poling, 
“South China Sea FONOP 2.0: A Step in the Right Direction”, 
AMTI Brief, 2 February 2016. 
61  Cf. Sam LaGrone, “U.S. Destroyer Passes near Chinese 
Artificial Island in South China Sea Freedom of Navigation 
Operation”, USNI News, 10 May 2016. 
62  While a state can acquire territory by contract, it can also 
acquire a stateless area (terra nullius) with its territorial waters 
by occupying it effectively, continuously and with a view to 
acquisition. Cf. Knut Ipsen, ed., Völkerrecht. Ein Studienbuch (6th 
entirely revised edition, Munich: Beck, 2014), 77; Alfred Ver-
dross and Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht. Theorie und Pra-
xis (2nd ed., Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1981), 557, 561–563. 
artificial islands cannot be undone, the claim to sov-
ereignty, the associated right to establish exclusive 
zones and the ensuing restriction of freedom of navi-
gation can certainly be denied. This also holds true 
for the right associated with such claims to establish 
exclusive zones and for any inferred restrictions on 
maritime freedom of action. Given the rival territorial 
claims, recognition of diverse exclusive zones would 
leave the South China Sea looking like a Swiss cheese, 
gravely obstructing freedom of navigation in one of 
the world’s most important sea routes. 
President Obama has frequently been criticised for 
his policy of military restraint. Beijing’s activities in 
the South China Sea likewise caused members of Con-
gress and high-ranking officers to push long and hard 
for the US Navy to be deployed. In the run-up to Chi-
nese president Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington in Sep-
tember 2015, however, Obama correctly gauged the 
difficult situation for Beijing and mustered strategic 
patience. He delayed deploying the USS Lassen until 
its impact was less confrontational (but also more 
ambiguous and controversial). The deployment thus 
mirrored the confusion and ambiguity characterising 
China’s maritime claims. Australia, Japan, the Philip-
pines and South Korea welcomed the operation. 
The Malaysian Defence Minister, who a few days later 
hosted the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus 
(ADMM-Plus), also described the patrol as “very impor-
tant”. Beijing, on the other hand, inevitably criticised 
the US operation for what it claimed was an illegal 
unauthorised transit through Chinese territorial 
waters.63 In any event, the three “Freedom of Naviga-
tion” operations carried out so far by the United States 
have only been tactical successes in the protracted 
conflict over freedom of the seas and control of the 
South China Sea. Indeed, an US expert believes that 
freedom of navigation is currently as strongly threat-
ened as it was during Imperial Germany’s unrestricted 
submarine campaign of 1915.64 
At stake are not just a couple of outposts, but ele-
mentary principles and historic claims, over which 
the United States and China disagree. That is what 
 
63  Green et al., The U.S. Asserts Freedom of Navigation (see note 55); 
Yeganeh Torbati and Trinna Leong, “U.S., Japan Push for Inclu-
sion of South China Sea in Defense Form Statement”, Reuters, 
3 November 2015; Matthew Southerland, “U.S. Freedom of 
Navigation Patrol in the South China Sea: What Happened, 
What It Means, and What’s Next”, USOUTH CHINA SEA Issue 
Brief, 5 November 2015. 
64  Kraska, “The Legal Rationale for Going Inside 12” 
(see note 56). 
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makes it so difficult to resolve the disputes and to 
prevent crisis escalation. The commander of the US 
Pacific Fleet, Admiral Harris, stated in January 2016 
that “Freedom of Navigation” operations will grow in 
frequency, complexity, and scope.65 During an April 
2016 operation, however, Washington was careful not 
to provoke Beijing excessively. Instead of a “Freedom 
of Navigation” operation near a Chinese outpost at 
Mischief Reef, four A-10 type US ground attack aircraft 
conducted an overflight of the Scarborough Reef, 
which is claimed by both China and the Philippines.66 
Unlike previous FONOPs, the overflight caused hardly 
any public debate. Its ostensible purpose was to pre-
vent China from erecting military-use infrastructure 
on this reef, as it had on the Spratly Islands. If this 
interpretation is correct, Washington pre-empted a 
fait accompli.67 Given that Beijing is sticking to its 
claims and the US Navy intends to step up its FON 
operations, a latent escalation potential is the new 
normal in the South China Sea. 
The political and military implications of 
the Chinese outposts 
The South China Sea conflict will determine future 
interactions between China and its neighbours, as 
well as its relationship with the United States. South-
east Asian neighbours, such as Vietnam and the Philip-
 
65  Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “US Will Push Chinese Harder on 
Territorial Claims: PACOM”, Breaking Defense, 27 January 2016; 
Andrea Shalal and Idrees Ali, “U.S. Navy Plans Two or More 
Patrols in South China Sea per Quarter”, Reuters, 2 November 
2015. 
66  Scarborough Reef is claimed by China and is the object 
of arbitration in The Hague, initiated by the Philippines. 
67  “First, it clearly communicated U.S. interests before Chinese 
activity began, rather than waiting for a Chinese fait accompli. 
Second, it practiced immediate deterrence by signaling that 
‘specific actions will have specific consequences,’ instead of 
trying to rely only on heretofore ineffective general deter-
rence. Third, and perhaps most important, Washington 
demonstrated that it was willing to accept some risk, by placing 
U.S. forces near Scarborough and elsewhere in the region to 
conduct operations continuously. Fourth, rather than draw-
ing public red lines, the administration communicated its de-
claratory policy quietly – speaking softly but carrying a big stick, 
while still preserving some flexibility.” Zack Cooper and Jake 
Douglas, “Successful Signaling at Scarborough Shoal?”, War 
on the Rocks, 2 May 2016 (original italics). Cf. Sam LaGrone, 
“McCain to SECDEF Carter: U.S. South China Sea Presence 
Operations Should Be ‘Magnified’ Not ‘Classified’”, USNI News, 
28 April 2016. 
pines, have responded to Chinese threats to their 
sovereignty claims by modernising their armed forces 
and turning towards the United States. In just a few 
years, maritime cooperation with Vietnam has grown 
from port visits of the US Navy to multi-day joint 
exercises. Vietnam (and Malaysia) will also get marine 
surveillance training and equipment. The Enhanced 
Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed in 
Manila in 2014 allows US armed forces to use eight 
Philippine military bases. Two of them are only 500 
miles from the Chinese outpost on the Spratly archi-
pelago. Indonesia also increasingly participates in 
maritime surveillance exercises with US forces. 
In April 2015, these included flights over the South 
China Sea for the first time. To date, any direct con-
frontation has been avoided – all the actors in the 
South China Sea are proceeding with caution. 
But the Chinese claims to individual outposts 
are only part of the problem. The larger and better 
connected the bases are in the long term, the more 
control China will be able to exert over the South 
China Sea and its sea routes. The central geostrategic 
location of the Sea could eventually give China a heg-
emonic role in the region. This would allow Beijing to 
redefine the rules not only of navigation in the region 
but also of international affairs in the West Pacific. 
China’s land reclamation can be interpreted as part 
of a defensive military strategy.68 The transfer of mis-
sile batteries and radar facilities in February 2016 
presumably means that the newly consolidated bases 
will be used as a robust “buffer zone” to keep US forces 
at bay, thus implementing an Anti-Access/Area Denial 
(A2/AD) strategy. Another crucial question remains 
whether the new facilities are intended to serve as 
gateways for actions against bases and outposts of 
other claimant states. Once established, the outposts 
can be used both for maritime exploration and for 
further expansion, depending on political will, the 
type of infrastructure and its equipment. It is not yet 
possible to determine whether Beijing plans to leave 
the path of peaceful development. The outposts’ vul-
nerability certainly does not make them fit for a mili-
tary confrontation, but they are an important part of 
the effort to gain control of the South China Sea.69 
 
68  Cf. Christian Becker, Die militärstrategische Bedeutung des Süd-
chinesischen Meeres. Überlegungen zum chinesischen Kalkül im Insel-
streit, SWP-Aktuell 82/2015 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, September 2015). 
69  “If the Chinese continue their construction projects, ‘you 
can imagine a network of missile sites, runways for their 5th 
generation fighters, and surveillance sites,’ Harris told the 
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China’s deployment of two missile batteries on 
Woody Island was clearly a provocation. It became 
known shortly before the end of a conference at which 
President Obama had hosted Southeast Asian leaders 
as well as the ASEAN Secretary-General for a two-day 
summit at the Sunnylands Center in California, to dis-
cuss ways of de-escalating the conflict in the region.70 
Woody Island is part of the Paracel archipelago which 
is also claimed by both Taiwan and Vietnam. China’s 
ground-to-air missiles deployed there are of the HQ-9 
type, with a radius of 200 kilometres, and are used for 
air defence. Their purpose seems to be to stop other 
states from conducting aerial patrols and thus also 
to deter further reconnaissance, including for PR pur-
poses. However, their radar can also be used to target 
ships. In a comment by the state news agency Xinhua, 
China called news about the missile deployment a 
“media hype”.71 But given the timing the missile 
deployment was a signal to Washington that Beijing 
was able and willing to escalate (although it did not 
contradict previous statements by the Chinese presi-
dent, who did not mention the Paracel Islands).72 As 
 
senators. ‘China would have de facto control over the South 
China Sea in any scenario short of war.’ But in a shooting 
war with the US, he said, ‘these are obviously easy targets.’” 
Freedberg, “US Hasn’t Challenged Chinese ‘Islands’ since 
2012” (see note 57). Cf. O’Rourke, Maritime and EEZ Disputes 
(see note 7), 3. 
70  See Joint Statement of the ASEAN-U.S. Special Leaders’ Summit: 
Sunnylands Declaration, 17 February 2016, http://www.asean. 
org/joint-statement-of-the-asean-u-s-special-leaders-summit-
sunnylands-declaration/. 
71  “For starters, China has indisputable sovereignty over the 
Xisha Islands and deploying limited and necessary national 
defense facilities on China’s own territory has nothing to do 
with militarization in the South China Sea. China has repeat-
edly made it clear that it has no intention to militarize the 
region. Its activities are mainly for maintenance purposes, 
improving the living conditions for the stationed personnel 
there and providing more public goods in the region.” “Com-
mentary: Washington’s Destabilizing Role in South China 
Sea”, Xinhua, 18 February 2016. Cf. “China verlagert Raketen 
auf international umstrittene Insel”, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 17 February 2016; Daniel Hurst, Oliver Holmes and 
Justin McCurry, “Beijing Places Missile Launchers on Disputed 
South China Sea Island”, The Guardian, 17 February 2016; 
Mark Landler and Michael Forsythe, “Chinese Missiles Under-
score a Growing Conflict Risk”, New York Times, 18 February 
2016, 4. 
72  Xi Jinping declared in Washington in September 2015 
that China had no intention of militarising the Nansha (Sprat-
ly) Islands. Cf. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Few Choices for US as 
China Militarizes South Pacific”, Breaking Defense, 17 February 
2016; David Ignatius, “The U.S. Is Heading toward a Danger-
ous Showdown with China”, Washington Post, 15 March 2016. 
recently as January 2016 a civilian aircraft landing 
on Fiery Cross Reef was viewed as a sign of Chinese 
restraint. But that was before it became known that 
J-11 combat aircraft and JH-7 fighter bombers had 
been deployed in hardened hangars on Woody Island. 
In late March 2016, there were reports that China had 
also transferred type YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missiles 
and tested one of them from the island. Radar facil-
ities have been built on smaller outposts in the Spratly 
Islands (Gaven, Hughes, Johnson South, Cuarteron), 
expanding China’s reconnaissance capabilities. Almost 
the entire sea area claimed by China can now be covered 
in triangles (Fiery Cross–Subi–Mischief and Paracel–
Spratly–Mischief) by aircraft, missiles and radar.73 As 
sensors and weapons, they could be the first compo-
nents of an Air Defence Identification Zone and thus 
of a denial strategy (A2/AD). This would transform the 
Great Wall of Sand from a metaphor into a reality. 
In the long term, China’s ongoing naval build-up is 
just as suggestive. If up to three more aircraft carriers 
are built and corresponding carrier groups created 
by approximately 2030, the South China Sea could 
be transformed into a “Chinese pond”.74 Although the 
outposts are highly vulnerable in a military conflict,75 
they will be important as “stationary aircraft carriers” 
in a transitional phase – until the South China Sea has 
become a sea in southern China. 
China wants to secure its claims in the South China 
Sea by all means necessary. That does not mean it is pre-
paring for a military confrontation. Rather, the future 
exploitation of oil and gas reserves is a further trigger 
for China’s activities. Such exploitation can best be 
 
73  Cf. Liu Zhen, “Chinese Civilian Aircraft Make Test Run to 
Fiery Cross Reef in South China Sea”, South China Morning Post, 
6 January 2016; “Another Piece of the Puzzle. China Builds 
New Radar Facilities in the Spratly Islands”, AMTI, 22 Febru-
ary 2016; Michael Forsythe, “Report Shows China Building 
Radar Facilities”, New York Times, 24 February 2016, 8; Freed-
berg, “Few Choices for US” (see note 72); Bill Gertz, “Pentagon 
Concerned by Chinese Anti-Ship Missile Firing”, Washington Free 
Beacon, 30 March 2016. 
74  Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks and Mark Cancian, Asia-
Pacific Rebalance 2025. Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships. An In-
dependent Review of U.S. Defense Strategy in the Asia-Pacific (Wash-
ington, DC: CSIS, January 2016), 19. 
75  The vulnerability of outposts depends on the situation 
as it develops. They could undoubtedly be destroyed in a mili-
tary confrontation. However, this would require concerted 
action in a scenario where the necessary forces are already 
involved in military operations. In addition, the PLA can 
make approaching these bases very risky by stationing both 
air defence and combat aircraft that could take off from the 
base runways. 
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safeguarded when the disputed area is protected by 
one’s own security forces. When oil prices are low, 
however, extracting offshore fossil fuel reserves only 
makes sense if there are substantially growing energy 
needs to be met or if China wants to shake off its 
dependence on transport routeslike the Malacca Strait. 
Here too future developments in the region will indi-
cate the course that Beijing wants to pursue. 
In any event, the new bases have considerable sig-
nificance for military strategy, especially for China’s 
future sea-based nuclear deterrent. Strategic sub-
marines of the Jin (type 094) class, equipped with 
12 ballistic missiles each, can now be much better 
shielded from reconnaissance and surveillance when 
leaving the naval base on the island of Hainan. The 
outposts expand China’s air defence range and sub-
stantially improve its capabilities for maritime sur-
veillance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Some 
have even called the area a sanctuary76 for China’s 
submarine fleet. The bases also boost China’s pre-
viously underdeveloped capability for combating sub-
marines; helicopters and aircraft can now conduct 
surveillance on sea areas that were previously out of 
reach from Hainan or the mainland. This capacity is 
also enhanced by the runway on Mischief Reef and 
the expansion of Duncan Island into a landing site 
for Z-18F-type helicopters.77 Not only can China now 
monitor Vietnamese submarines, it can potentially 
breach, at least in part, the submarine barrier planned 
in the US’s concept of “Air-Sea Battle” and will in the 
long term eventually establish another “Great Wall” 
under water.78 While the outposts are vulnerable in 
military conflicts, they complicate reconnaissance 
and surveillance by foreign forces. In a crisis, Chinese 
submarines could exploit this tactical advantage and 
reach deeper waters before they could become the tar-
gets of ASW. 
 
76  O’Rourke, Maritime and EEZ Disputes (see note 7), 3; Raine 
and Le Mière, Regional Disorder (see note 1), 66. 
77  Cf. Dolven et al., Chinese Land Reclamation (see note 30), 11; 
Greg Torode, “China’s Island Airstrips to Heighten South 
China Sea Underwater Rivalry”, Reuters, 17 September 2015; 
Sam LaGrone, “China Reclaimed Land for South China Sea 
Anti-Submarine Helicopter Base Near Vietnam”, USNI News, 
15 February 2016. 
78  Cf. Matteo Dian, “The Pivot to Asia, Air-Sea Battle and Con-
tested Commons in the Asia Pacific Region”, The Pacific Review 
28, no. 2 (2015): 249; Richard D. Fisher, “China proposes ‘Under-
water Great Wall’ that could erode US, Russian submarine 
advantage”, IHS Jane’s 360, 17 May 2016. 
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Map 3 
Spratly Archipelago outposts 
Source: Peter Forster, Das Bulletin No. 1, 
http://www.das-bulletin.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/150514_spratlyOutpostsMap.jpg. 
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Outcomes and Prospects 
 
The tense situation in the South China Sea risks 
becoming the “new normal”.79 International concern 
is mounting. At the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting 
in Hiroshima in April 2016, the Ministers expressed 
“concern” over the increasing tensions in the East and 
South China Seas. Southeast Asian states expressed in 
June 2016 their “serious concerns“ over recent and 
ongoing developments in the South China Sea, which 
have increased tensions and have the potential to 
undermine peace, security and stability.80 But what 
further means and methods might there be to prevent 
an escalation spiral? 
A constructive diplomatic approach would be for 
ASEAN states and China to negotiate a binding code 
of conduct for the South China Sea. Such negotiations 
could also provide a starting-point for a rebalanced 
transatlantic policy toward the Asia-Pacific by the EU 
and the United States.81 Efforts to produce a diplomatic 
settlement could be backed by certain defensive meas-
 
79  “While it is clear that U.S. policy is still evolving, Assistant 
Secretary of State Daniel Russel underscored that the admin-
istration is playing the long game; it recognizes that high 
tensions and provocations are the new normal in the South 
China Sea.” Gregory B. Poling, Grappling with the South China 
Sea Policy Challenge. A Report of the CSIS Sumitro Chair for Southeast 
Asia Studies, Washington, DC: CSIS, August 2015, 2. Cf. O’Han-
lon, “Don’t be Provoked” (see note 52). 
80  At the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Hiroshima, Japan, 
on 11 April 2016, the Foreign Ministers of Germany, France, 
the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Canada and the US expressed 
“concern” over the increasing tensions in the East and South 
China Seas. While not addressing China explicitly, they em-
phatically opposed “all intimidation or unilateral provoca-
tion”, for instance by building outposts or using them for 
military purposes. The strongly-worded statement by ASEAN 
was released by the Malaysian foreign ministry. Just hours 
later, a Malaysian ministry spokeswoman recalled the state-
ment. Cf. G7 Foreign Minister’s Statement on Maritime Security, 
Hiroshima, 11 April 2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-
eeas/2016/160411_05_en.htm; Rozanna Latiff, “Southeast 
Asian countries retract statement expressing concerns on 
South China Sea”, Reuters, 15 June 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/ 
article/uk-southchinasea-asean-idUKKCN0Z10L1. 
81  More actionable policy recommendations for transatlan-
tic policymakers can be found in the CSIS report by Heather 
A. Conley, James Mina and Phuong Nguyen, A Rebalanced Trans-
atlantic Policy toward the Asia-Pacific Region, Washington, DC: 
CSIS, Mai 2016. 
ures without an escalating effect, such as improving 
the maritime surveillance capabilities and civil 
resources of neighbouring countries. Expanding the 
coast guard and surveillance capabilities of the Philip-
pines and Vietnam would enable them better to safe-
guard maritime security in their territorial waters. 
The US suggestion of consolidating and coordinating 
information on this sea area would be helpful here. 
The hub of the proposed network, the Information 
Fusion Centre (IFC), could be Singapore. In May 2015, 
US Secretary of Defence Carter launched an initiative 
of this kind for Southeast Asian states, funded by 425 
million US dollars over five years.82 
The dispute between the United States and China 
over maritime norms and laws is likely to continue 
in its current restrained form, but it has the potential 
to endanger the rule of law also in other parts of the 
world.83 It is in the interest of all to avoid a direct con-
frontation. Wherever possible “Freedom of Navigation” 
operations should be conducted multilaterally in 
combination with Southeast Asian navies. Australia, 
Singapore, India and even European countries could 
likewise contribute to underlining the international 
significance of freedom of navigation. Prospective 
US-Indian patrols84 – as well as possible cooperation 
 
82  Cf. DoD, Asia-Pacific Maritime Strategy (see note 7), 28; DoD, 
A Regional Security Architecture Where Everyone Rises (see note 26); 
Simon Denyer, “U.S. Weighs Options in South China Sea”, 
Washington Post, 14 May 2015, A08; Dolven et al., Chinese Land 
Reclamation (see note 30), 21; O’Rourke, Maritime and EEZ Dis-
putes (see note 7), 35. 
83  “This issue is of the utmost importance, and not only for 
the stability and security of the region, because, if the Law 
of the Sea is not observed in the China seas today, it will be 
in jeopardy in the Arctic, the Mediterranean and elsewhere 
tomorrow. In order to keep the risk of conflict contained, 
we must defend the Law and defend ourselves with the Law.“ 
Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister of Defence, France, “The Chal-
lenges of Conflict Resolution”, in IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2016 
Fourth Plenary Session, 5 June 2016, http://www.iiss.org/en/ 
events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-
2016-4a4b/plenary4-6c15/drian-5b52. 
84  Manu Balachandran, “US, Indian Navies Planning Joint 
Patrols in South China Sea”, Defense One, 11 February 2016. 
Cf. Gurpreet Singh Khurana, “First China-India Maritime 
Dialogue: Beyond ‘Icebreaking’”, CIMSEC, 5 April 2016, http:// 
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between India and Japan in the northwest of the 
Malacca Strait85 – would signal to the Chinese leader-
ship the growing concerns in the Indo-Pacific much 
more clearly than any commitment of Southeast Asian 
states within the ASEAN framework. The first joint US-
Philippine patrols started in March 2016. Australian 
involvement has also been proposed, since two-thirds 
of its foreign trade transit through the South China 
Sea. This might include Australian-Philippine capacity-
building.86 Japan also intends to join US (or Philip-
pine) navy patrols in the South China Sea and conduct 
reconnaissance flights using P-3C Orion type maritime 
patrol aircraft, to be refuelled in turn by Vietnam, the 
Philippines and Malaysia.87 However, Japanese opera-
tions would not de-escalate the conflict; they would 
fan the flames. Therefore Tokyo currently seems un-
willing to put such plans into action.88 Further US 
Navy “Freedom of Navigation” operations also carry 
the risk of escalation and confrontations with Chinese 
ships. And clashes with “civilian” vessels of the Chi-
nese maritime militia could make US warships look 
either helpless or brutal.89 
How might it be possible to generate more concilia-
tion rather than escalation? Proposals ranging from 
fishing to Search and Rescue (SAR) have frequently 
been cited as potential civilian areas of cooperation.90 
 
cimsec.org/first-china-india-maritime-dialogue-beyond-
icebreaking/23990. 
85  The Andaman Islands and Nicobar Islands are located on 
an important access route to the Malacca Strait. Their infra-
structure is to be expanded. See Ellen Barry, “As India Col-
laborates with Japan on Islands, It Looks to Check China”, 
New York Times, 11 March 2016. 
86  David Wroe, “Admiral Urges Australia to Join Patrols”, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 23 February 2016, 5; Simon Denyer, 
“China Fumes at U.S. Military Patrols”, Washington Post, 
15 April 2016, A14. 
87  Kyle Mizokami, “Essay: Understanding Japan’s Shifting 
Defense Policy”, USNI News, 20 August 2015; “Japan’s Self-
Defense Forces to Cover More of South China Sea”, Chicago 
Tribune, 12 January 2016. 
88  Cf. Sam LaGrone, “U.S. 7th Fleet CO: Japanese Patrols of 
South China Sea ‘Makes Sense’”, USNI News, 29 January 2015; 
Sam LaGrone, “China on ‘High Alert’ to Prevent Japan from 
Entering South China Sea Disputes”, USNI News, 19 January 
2016. 
89  Cf. Andrew Browne, Gordon Lubold and Trefor Moss, 
“China’s Island-Building Poses Dilemma for U.S.”, Wall Street 
Journal, 1 June 2015; Poling, Grappling with the South China Sea 
Policy (see note 79), 5; Jerry Hendrix, “China Is Cruising for a 
Bruising”, Defense One, 22 February 2016; Raine and Le Mière, 
Regional Disorder (see note 1), 190f. 
90  Inter alia, cf. Raine and Le Mière, Regional Disorder 
(see note 1), 205–208. 
Other steps towards a cooperation spiral have been 
recommended by Lyle Goldstein of the U.S. Naval War 
College’s China Institute. According to him, the United 
States could invite (US 1) China to the international 
manoeuvre Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 
(CARAT). In return, China could propose (PRC1) joint 
deployments against pirates91 in the Malacca Strait. 
Then the US could create (US 2) a forum for a South-
east Asian coast guard, and China open (PRC 2) the 
military complex on Hainan for annual visits by 
ASEAN states. The US could then reduce (US 3) its 
surveillance in the northern South China Sea, and 
China could verify (PRC 3) its NDL claims against 
maritime law. In return Washington supports (US 4) 
China’s bilateral negotiation attempts in the island 
dispute, to which Beijing responds (PRC 4) by initiat-
ing substantial joint developments consistent with 
the principle of equality.92 The result of a cooperation 
spiral would not be an exclusive zone of influence for 
China, but instead a territory jointly managed by China 
and the United States. Vietnamese and Philippine 
efforts to internationalise the conflict can partly be 
explained by their resistance to such an idea which is, 
in the end, a US-Chinese condominium. They want to 
subject the South China Sea to comparable rules so 
that all coastal states (and the United States) can enjoy 
equal rights. 
Beijing’s assertive approach has complicated the 
political, military and legal situation in the South 
China Sea. Increasingly, the rhetoric of cooperation 
is giving way to the reality of intensified competition. 
Neither Beijing nor Washington currently seem pre-
pared to back down. After the presidential elections, 
Washington will need some time to establish its for-
eign policy staff and coordinate its new China policy. 
But Beijing can expect more competitive attitudes 
from the new US government, regardless of the elec-
tion results. In the meantime China will therefore try 
to change the situation in the South China Sea to its 
own advantage. In the long term, if the United States 
and China cannot agree on a mutually beneficial 
cooperation, a divisive Great Wall of Sand risks being 
erected in people’s minds, further complicating con-
structive approaches to cooperation and to contain-
ment of the conflict. 
 
91  In 2015, Asian piracy made up about three-quarters of all 
pirate activity reported to the International Maritime Bureau 
(IMB). 
92  Lyle J. Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway. How to Defuse the 
Emerging US-China Rivalry (Washington, DC: Georgetown Uni-
versity, 2015), 284, 291. 
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Abbreviations 
A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial 
ADIZ Air Defence Identification Zone 
ADMM ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting 
AMTI Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (CSIS, 
Washington, DC) 
ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASPI Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Canberra) 
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare 
CARAT Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 
CCG China Coast Guard 
CFR Council on Foreign Relations 
CIMSEC Centre for International Maritime Security 
CLCS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(United Nations) 
CNAS Centre for a New American Security 
CNN Cable News Network 
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(Washington, DC) 
DoC Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea 
DoD U.S. Department of Defence 
DoS U.S. Department of State 
EDCA Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
EIA U.S. Energy Information Administration 
FON Freedom of Navigation 
FONOP Freedom of Navigation Operation 
IFC Information Fusion Centre 
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies 
IMB International Maritime Bureau 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
MMbbl/d million barrels per day 
NDL Nine-Dash Line 
NSC National Security Council (USA) 
PACOM Pacific Command (USA) 
PLA People’s Liberation Army (People’s Republic of China) 
PLAN PLA Navy 
PR People’s Republic 
SAR Search and Rescue 
SECDEF Secretary of Defence (USA) 
UN United Nations 
UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
USNI U.S. Naval Institute 
USNS United States Naval Ship 
USS United States Ship 
